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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 37 SPRING 2001 NUMBER 2
MAJORITARIAN POLITICS AND THE PUNISHMENT
OF SPEECH
H.N. HIRSCH *
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Cohen v. San Bernadino Community College
Dean Cohen is a tenured professor of English at San Bernadino Valley
Community College in California.' In 1992, a female student enrolled in
Cohen's class ("Remedial English") filed a formal complaint against him. In
that course, Cohen "discussed subjects such as obscenity, cannibalism, and
consensual sex with children in a 'devil's advocate style."'2 It seems Cohen
routinely told his students that he had written for magazines such as Hustler,
and sometimes read from such periodicals in his classes? Cohen often used
profanity, and his discussions of sex were, according to the student, "di-
rected intentionally at her and other female students in a humiliating and
harassing manner."' When Cohen assigned his students an essay defining
pornography-a routine exercise in constitutional law classes, if not in the
English department-the student objected; she asked for a different assign-
ment, but Cohen refused.' The student stopped attending the class and re-
ceived a failing grade.6
. G. Theodore Mitau Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Macalester College,
and Adjunct Professor at the University of Minnesota. A.B., University of Michigan, 1974;
Ph.D., Princeton University, 1978.
I. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 969-70 (91 Cir. 1996).
2. id. at 970.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. id.
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A faculty panel, the college's president, and its governing board all
found that Cohen had violated the college's new sexual harassment policy.7
Adopted in 1991, that policy prohibited "sexual harassment which unrea-
sonably interfere[s] with an individual's academic performance and create[s]
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive learning environment."8 This definition
of "sexual harassment" is nearly identical to definitions of "racist speech"
found in college speech codes because it repeats the formula requiring sanc-
tions against "hostile or offensive" environments."
In a unanimous decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
1996 that the College violated Cohen's First Amendment rights." The deci-
sion was significant in that it was the first time a federal court addressed the
issue of sexual harassment in the context of First Amendment on a college
campus. The Circuit Court ruled that the college's policy was "too vague as
applied to Cohen."" Cohen's speech "did not fall within the core region of
sexual harassment" as defined by the College's policy. 2 "Instead, officials of
the College... applied the Policy's nebulous outer reaches to punish teach-
ing methods that Cohen had used for many years." 3
B. The New Threat to First Amendment Freedoms
There is a disturbing trend-in courts, including the Supreme Court, but also
among commentators-to sanction the punishment of thought and/or the ex-
pression of thought. We find it in many instances such as the punishment of
speech that creates a hostile environment in sexual harassment cases, the de-
sire to enhance criminal punishments in cases of racial bias and the solicita-
tion of "non-ideological" crime. Each of these is a different way to punish
unpopular ideas. Worse still, for many courts and commentators these issues
appear rather easy to decide; Harris v. Forklift Systems 4 and Wisconsin v.
Mitchell5 are decisions by a unanimous Supreme Court, a Court whose ma-
jority is in some contexts quite zealous in its protection of First Amendment
freedoms.'
7. Id. at 971.
8. Id. at 970-71.
9. See my discussion of college speech codes in H.N. Hirsch, Second Thoughts on the
First Amendment, in THE PRINCETON PUBLIC LAW TRADITION (forthcoming 2001).
10. Cohen, 92 F.3d at 972.
11. 92 F.3d at 972.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. 510 U.S. 17 (1993)
15. 508 U.S. 576 (1993)
16. See Burt Neuborne, Pushing Free Speech Too Far, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1996, at
A13. In this op-ed column published at the conclusion of the Court's 1995-96 term, Neub-
ome, former director of the ACLU, said "the current Supreme Court is the fiercest defender of
the First Amendment in the Court's history." Neuborne cites decisions about commercial
speech, political patronage, campaign spending by political parties, and cable television. Id.
[Vol. 37
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This article examines three areas that are outside the traditional political
concerns of the First Amendment but are part of a disturbing trend toward
the punishment of ideas and thoughts: sexual harassment; the solicitation and
encouragement of crime; and the enhancement of punishments in race moti-
vated crimes. This article also offers an explanation of this trend: ironically,
it is caused by commentators such as Mieklejohn,"7 who champion the First
Amendment as a shield to protect political speech and ideas. By exploring
the development of libel law this article will show how the functionalist ap-
proach has over-focused the First Amendment and thus reduced its intended
protection. Unless we alter our functionalist approach to the First Amend-
ment, it may no longer function to protect our freedoms as it was intended.
II. How WE SANCTION THE PUNISHMENT OF THOUGHT
A. Sexual Harassment Law and the Creation of a Hostile Work Environment
1. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson"8 the Supreme Court began to
consider seriously the issues posed by sexual harassment. There, the Court
construed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, which forbids employment dis-
crimination on the basis of gender, to forbid "hostile environment" harass-
ment in the workplace, and not merely discrimination in the hiring and firing
of employees. 9
Mechelle Vinson was hired by Sidney Taylor, a bank vice president.
Vinson testified that during her probationary period at the bank, "Taylor
treated her in a fatherly way and made no sexual advances." '2 Soon, how-
ever, he invited her to dinner and suggested they have sexual relations." Ac-
cording to the Court, "at first she refused, but, out of what she described as
fear of losing her job she eventually agreed."'2 She had relations with him
"some 40 or 50 times."' Vinson testified that Taylor "fondled her in front of
other employees, followed her into the women's rest room when she went
See Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (commercial free speech); Denver
Telecommunications v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (indecent programming on cable televi-
sion); O'Hare v. Trucking v. Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (right of political association);
Board of Wabaunsee v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (retaliation for speech critical of the
government); and Colorado Republican Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996)
(campaign spending limits).
17. See, e.g, ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GovERNMENT (1948)
18. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
19. Id. at 66.
20. Id. at 59.
21. Id. at 60
22. id.
23. Id.
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there alone, exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several
occasions.""2 Vinson also testified "that Taylor touched and fondled other
women employees of the bank." Taylor's behavior eventually stopped after
Vinson acquired a steady boyfriend.26
The bank argued that in creating Title VII's prohibitions against dis-
crimination with respect to an employee's "compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges" of employment, Congress was concerned only with "tangible
loss" of "an economic character" and not the purely psychological aspects of
the workplace environment Thus Vinson was not due damages because she
had not suffered any economic loss.2" Justice Rehnquist, in his opinion for a
unanimous Court, relied heavily on EEOC guidelines to reject that view, and
to argue that female employees had a right "to work in an environment free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."29 Quoting a circuit
court opinion dealing with discrimination against Hispanics, Rehnquist said
that the Court "can readily envision working environments so heavily pol-
luted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psycho-
logical stability of minority group workers."' A violation of Title VII can be
established by "proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hos-
tile or abusive working environment."'
This phrase, "hostile or abusive work environment," thus enters consti-
tutional law as a description of the kind of environment that the Civil Rights
Act prohibits; the phrase returns in a more recent consideration of sexual
harassment in Harris v. Forklift Systems in 1993.32
2. Harris v. Forklift Systems
Teresa Harris worked as a manager at Forklift Systems, Inc., an equip-
ment rental company in Tennessee." Charles Hardy, the company President,
"often insulted her because of her gender and often made her the target of
unwanted sexual innuendoes."' Hardy would say things like "you're a
woman, what do you know," and call Harris "a dumb ass woman," often in
the presence of others.3" He suggested that he and Ms. Harris "go to the
24. Id.
25. ld. at 60-61.
26. Id. at 59-60.
27. Id. at 64.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 66.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 65-66.
32. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). It is worth noting that the Senate Judiciary Committee's hearings
on Clarence Thomas's confirmation to the Court came between Vinson and Harris.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Id.
35. Id.
220 [Vol. 37
4
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/2
2001] MAJORITARIAN POLITICS & THE PUNISHMENT OF SPEECH 221
Holiday Inn to negotiate [a] raise."36 He would sometimes ask Harris and
other women in the office to get coins from his pants pocket. 7 He "threw ob-
jects on the ground in front of Harris and other women, and asked them to
pick the objects up."3 He would make comments about the women's cloth-
ing.39
After enduring this for two years, Harris complained to Hardy about this
conduct.' "Hardy said he was surprised that Harris was offended, claimed he
was only joking, and apologized."'" Hardy promised he would stop, "and
based on this assurance Harris stayed on the job."'42 Another incident soon
followed: while Harris was dealing with a client, Hardy asked her, in front of
other employees, "what did you do, promise the guy some [sex] Saturday
night?"'43 Harris had had enough, quit, and sued in federal court, claiming
that Hardy's conduct "had created an abusive work environment because of
her gender.""
The case was assigned to a United States Magistrate Judge, and the re-
port and recommendation of the Magistrate were endorsed by the District
Court.' Finding this to be "a close case," the District Court held that Hardy's
conduct did not create an abusive environment under Title VII." The court
reasoned that although some of Hardy's comments seriously offended Har-
ris, "and would offend the reasonable woman," they were not "so severe as
to be expected to seriously affect [her] psychological well-being," nor did
they "rise to the level of interfering with [her] work performance," nor was
Harris "subjectively so offended that she suffered injury."'47 Although Hardy
was offensive, he did not "create" a "working environment so poisoned as to
be intimidating or abusive" to Harris.48 The Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court. 9
Lower federal courts had disagreed about the conduct necessary for a
violation of Title VII; some courts required psychological injury or at least
an effect on the employee's work performance while other courts required
less." When it overturned the Court of Appeals here, the Supreme Court
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 19-20.
46. Id. at 20.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 19-20.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
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sided with courts requiring less." Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous
Court, explained that "Title VII comes into play before the harassing con-
duct leads to a nervous breakdown." Congress intended "to strike at the en-
tire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment,"
which includes "requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or
abusive environment." ' Title VII is a "broad rule" for "workplace equal-
ity."'M The conduct in the previous case, Meritor Bank, was "especially egre-
gious," but did not "mark the boundary of what is actionable."55 Deciding
whether conduct violates Title VII cannot be done using "a mathematically
precise test."56 A decision is reached "only by looking at all the circum-
stances [which may include: (1) the frequency of the conduct, (2) its sever-
ity, (3)] whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offen-
sive utterance; and [(5)] whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance."'n
3. Analysis
a. Sexual Harassment is Defined Along a Continuum
There is no question but that Teresa Harris endured less than Mechelle
Vinson. There is also no question but that the Harris case, and cases like it,
are exercises in line drawing. We might say that the conduct we call sexual
harassment stretches along a continuum that would look something like this:
Offensiveness .... Hostility ..... Abusiveness ..... Psychological Injury
In Vinson and Harris the Supreme Court lumps together both hostile
and abusive conduct, and then draws a line between offensive conduct and
the rest. Merely offensive conduct is not actionable-presumably because it
is protected by the First Amendment, although the Court does not say so-
but "hostile or abusive" conduct, and conduct leading to psychological in-
jury, violates Title VII. Thus for the Supreme Court, the continuum looks
like this:
NOT ACTIONABLE ............................. ACTIONABLE
Offensiveness .... Hostility .. . Abusiveness ..... Psychological Injury
But, we must ask, does the First Amendment perhaps not create difficul-
ties for the line the Court has drawn? Is a "hostile" environment really the
same thing as an "abusive" one, as the Court assumes in Harris? Can the law
really outlaw all forms of "disparate treatment" without treading into the ter-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 21.
54. Id. at 22.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 23.
."[Vol. 37222
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ritory of personal opinion? In this light, it is perhaps instructive to compare
gender and sexual orientation.
b. Hostile vs. Abusive Workplaces for Sexual Orientation; A Personal Take
As a gay man, I have endured any number of work environments and
professional situations that I have considered offensive and hostile. I have
listened to the usual litany of "fag" jokes from colleagues, administrators,
and students. I have heard members of my professional association denounce
the study of gay and lesbian political behavior as "absurd" and "a waste of
time." I have listened to colleagues tell me I would damage my career by
teaching a course on gay and lesbian politics. As the Chair of the American
Political Science Association's Committee on the Status of Lesbians and
Gays, I have been embroiled in a dispute with the editor of the major journal
of my profession who clearly does not believe it is possible to be both
openly gay or lesbian and a respected member of the profession. I have sat
through a meeting of the Council of the same professional association in
which no one (in a group of 25 prominent scholars) was willing to speak up
to endorse a resolution in favor of a policy to protect gays and lesbians, a
resolution and policy already endorsed, unanimously, by a previous Council.
I have had countless conversations with colleagues in which it is clear that
their only recognized social categories are "single" and "heterosexually mar-
ried."
Many of these situations have been offensive to me. In the long run,
they have perhaps made it a bit more difficult to do my job. Some of these
situations and incidents have risen to the level of creating a hostile environ-
ment. Princeton University in the mid-1970s, where I did my graduate work,
was a hostile environment for gays and lesbians (although one in the process
of becoming less so). But I would stop short of characterizing any of the pro-
fessional environments in which I have found myself as abusive. I have suf-
fered no real professional loss because of any of them nor have I suffered
psychological damage. None of them has made me unhappy or fearful about
going to work, although I have certainly, on occasion, been humiliated, up-
set, and angry.
I can easily imagine what an abusive environment would look like, and
know of other gay men and lesbians who have been forced to endure one. If
the Chair of my department were to repeatedly refer to me as "that faggot,"
and mistreat me in various concrete ways-harder and larger courses to
teach, fewer perks-the environment would be abusive. But if I knew my
Chair to be homophobic and felt from him only slight social mistreatment-
the dinner invitation not received, the occasional overheard casual joke-I
would say that was a hostile but not an abusive situation.
7
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Of course these are not terribly clear lines, but the point is a serious one:
a hostile environment is not necessarily the same thing as an abusive one."
More importantly, the opinions and feelings expressed in the hostile envi-
ronment are opinions and feelings my superiors or co-workers are entitled to
have, and to express. I cannot say that the law should outlaw homophobia;
being a homophobe is protected by the First Amendment, just as being a rac-
ist is. What should not be protected is the homophobe who forces me to en-
dure professional loss because of his opinions, or who makes my environ-
ment so negative as to make it impossible for me to function. But hostility-
because of gender, because of race, because of sexual orientation-are
thoughts and feelings entitled to First Amendment protection.
c. Sexual Harassment Law Threatens the First Amendment Because it
Punishes What Should be Protected Thoughts About Gender
On this basis, was the Harris case wrongly decided? The line between
hostility and abuse may be an exceedingly narrow one; did Harris's tormen-
tor cross it, and cross it often and consistently enough, for him to be held li-
able? Although, as the original Magistrate argued, the case is a close one, I
would say the male superior's conduct in this case was closer to hostility
than to abuse, for the following reason: when Harris called the conduct to
Hardy's attention, the conduct ceased." This strongly indicates a state of
mind sensitive to Harris's concerns. One further "slip" produced Harris's
resignation and lawsuit.' Might not one further complaint have ended
Hardy's conduct for good? Perhaps a more cautionary approach is appropri-
ate. This is not meant as a denial of the impact of sexual harassment. Action-
able sexual harassment exists in both its quid-pro-quo form and in cases of
truly abusive mistreatment. Nonetheless "hostile environment" harassment is
a slippery slope that raises significant First Amendment questions.
One reason to err on the side of caution in cases such as Harris is a rea-
son familiar to First Amendment analysis: the tendency of speech-curbing
laws to expand. Once we enforce sanctions against speech creating a hostile
work environment, it is but a small step to enforcing sanctions against a
worker's personal pictures on a wall or a desk that can be construed as "a
58. See Amy Horton, Comment, Of Supervision, Centerfolds, and Censorship: Sexual
Harassment, the First Amendment, and the Countours of Title VII, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 403,
417 (1991) (citing ACLU Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, Policy #316). The American
Civil Liberties Union's policy statement on sexual harassment seemingly accepts a distinction
between hostile and abusive situations. The statement says that the recognition of "environ-
mental" sexual harassment should be limited to situations in which: (1) a pattern and practice
of sexual conduct or expression is directed at a specific employee; and (2) has definable con-
sequences for the individual victim that demonstrably hinders or completely prevents her or
his continuing to function as an employee. Id. The policy does not extend to verbal harass-
ment that has no other effect on its recipient than to create an unpleasant working environ-
ment. Id.
59. Harris, 510 U.S. at 19.
60. Id.
224 [Vol. 37
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visual assault on the sensibilities of female workers."', Could this also in-
clude casually overheard comments, not directed at a particular individual?
And if nude pictures can be sanctioned, what of partially nude photos? What
of a male worker displaying a picture of his wife in a provocatively cut
dress, or a picture in which he and his wife are engaged in a passionate kiss?
Might not some female-or even male-workers find such pictures a "visual
assault"? And if words directed at a female employee by a male supervisor
or co-worker are actionable, why not prohibit sexist comments made by a
male supervisor to another male and overheard by a female employee? If the
goal is a workplace free of hostility, rather than the more limited goal of a
workplace free of abuse, could not all expressions of sexism and all discus-
sions of sex and gender be banned?
Some legal commentary that supports expanding the definition of sexual
harassment also makes it clear that the goal of "hostile environment" har-
assment policy goes well beyond preventing the discriminatory treatment of
women in the workplace. Even pre-Harris commentators felt that "attitude,
language, and pictures," rather than "touching, grabbing, and fondling,"
were conditions "ripe for litigation."'62 Others noted that the law must "trans-
form... male-centered norms."63 However, attitudes, norms, and the expres-
sion thereof is what the First Amendment exists to protect, especially if that
expression is unpopular.'
In every other area of litigation, the Supreme Court does not allow the
distress of individuals who disagree with a speaker's expression to serve as
sufficient grounds for censorship.' Why is sexism in the workplace differ-
ent? According to Catherine MacKinnon, the workplace is different because
a woman at work is harassed if she "is perpetually made aware of her body
and its uses in the fantasies of her coworkers or supervisors."' It is also sug-
gested that workplaces are unlike other places, that the audience subjected to
61. Horton, supra note 58, at 404 n.4.
62. Telephone interview with K.C. Wagner, former Program Director for Working
Women's Institute and now a consultant "on issues of women and the work environment,"
quoted in Horton, supra note 58, at 414.
63. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1186 (1989), quoted in Horton, supra note 58, at 414.
64. See STEVEN SHiFRiN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY AND ROMANCE 5 (1990)
and Akhil Amar, Comment, The Missing Amendments: R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARv.
L. R v. 124, 152-53 (1992).
65. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that "Fuck the Draft" printed
on a jacket and worn in a courthouse is protected speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that wearing a black armband in
protest to the Vietnam War to high school is protected speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (holding that setting the Ameritan flag on fire as part of a political protest is pro-
tected speech).
66. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 40 (1979), quoted in HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST,
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON SEx-BASeD DISCRIMINATION 824 (4th ed. 1996).
9
Hirsch: Majoritarian Politics and the Punishment of Speech
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2000
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
annoying remarks or pictures in a workplace cannot simply walk away.' But
even scholars who make much of this "captive audience" argument concede
that "for many people, the workplace is [also] a main locus of discussion
about public affairs and matters of personal significance," and that "free
speech has strong relevance for workplace communication, as it does for
communication among families and friends. 6' Thus if we say the First
Amendment has no applicability in the workplace, we would be saying that
is has no applicability to the only "public" space most individuals ever oc-
cupy.
III. SOLICITATION, ENCOURAGEMENT, AND THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS
Many discussions of non-ideological crime 9 have often carelessly
lumped together encouragement and solicitation in much the same way that
the Supreme Court's sexual harassment jurisprudence has rather carelessly
lumped together hostile environments and abusive environments, which also
seems to have created similar First Amendment difficulties."
In one example Kent Greenawalt poses the question of whether the
Brandenburg standard, 'incitement to imminent lawlessness,"should be used
to "set a general constitutional limit on punishment for urging criminal
acts."' If the Brandenburg standard were adopted, only encouragement or
solicitation that resulted in immediate action could be punished. Gre-
enawalt opposes such a move, and poses this question: "If a sister writes to
her brother urging that he steal money from their parents, is that protected
speech... T" As Greenawalt explains, "American cases have not generally
assumed that such ordinary criminal solicitation presents a serious First
Amendment problem," and neither does he, "because directly urging some-
one else in private to commit a garden-variety crime does not significantly
implicate the values of free speech."74
But is the issue really so simple? Take Greenawalt's example of the
brother and sister. Suppose that one or both of them had been sexually
abused by one or both of their parents; would we not want the First Amend-
ment to protect a letter from one to the other urging some kind of revenge?
Or suppose that the parents in question were rich drug dealers, or pornogra-
phers; would that not change the moral calculus? Almost certainly it would.
It is an enormous error to assume that speech that does not involve in some
67. See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND
LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 86-87 (1995).
68. Id. at 83.
69. Crime that is not part of a discussion of political ideas.
70. For my analysis of "ideological" crime, see Hirsch supra note 9.
71. GREENAWALT, supra note 67, at 19.
72. Id. at 18-19.
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id.
226 [Vol. 37
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way public affairs or politics is somehow less "worthy" speech, and yet this
is an error that has governed most First Amendment analysis in the twentieth
century, both on and off the Supreme Court.
Moreover, there is an important First Amendment principle involved in
not allowing the state to punish the mere "encouragement" of crime-as op-
posed to the more direct acts of conspiracy or solicitation:" the fact that the
autonomy of the listener must be respected. If a sister urges her brother to
commit a crime, that is she tries to convince him that the commission of a
certain crime would be a good thing, the brother, unless he is incapacitated
in some way, has the power to refuse. For the crime actually to take place
something else would have to happen beyond the sister's mere encourage-
ment: the brother would have to make a decision, and then carry it out (with
or without his sister's assistance). Such a decision to act would be his, and
his right to make that decision is what the First Amendment is meant to pro-
tect. If the First Amendment protects autonomy, it must be understood to
protect autonomy in all realms, not merely in those realms the Court consid-
ers important, such as the political arena or the realm of "personal" decisions
such as abortion."'
IV. RACIALLY MOTIVATED HATE CRIME LEGISLATION: INCREASING THE
PUNISHMENT FOR YOUR THOUGHTS
When we move from the encouragement of crime to crimes actually
committed, a vexing issue becomes enhanced punishment for specific mo-
tives. The Supreme Court considered this issue in Wisconsin v. Mitchell" in
1993.
The case arose out of an incident of racially-tinged assault and battery.
Mitchell, an African-American, was gathered outside an apartment complex
in Kenosha, Wisconsin with friends and neighbors. 8 They were discussing
the then-recent film "Mississippi Burning," and specifically a scene in which
a white man beat a young black boy. 9 Mitchell asked the group, "Do you
75. Solicitation is sometimes defined as the attempt to conspire, that is, solicitation usu-
ally indicates that two individuals will agree to commit a crime together. See KENT
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 241 (1989). See also generally
id. at ch. 15. As Greenawalt has commented more recently, American courts have not yet
given an adequate definition of solicitation. GREENAWALT, supra note 67, at 19. Conspiracy is
typically defined as "a combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for
the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 382 (4th ed. 1968).
76. Early in the twentieth century the Supreme Court began to treat family life, and deci-
sions about family life, as fundamental rights protected by the due process clause; it eventu-
ally treated a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as falling within the same sphere.
See my discussion in HARRY HIRSCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTITUTION AND
MINORITIES ch. 3 (1992).
77. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
78. Id. at 479-80.
79. Id.
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feel hyped up to move on some white people?""0 Soon, a young white boy
walked by and Mitchell said, "You all want to fuck somebody up? There
goes a white boy; go get him."'" Mitchell counted to three and then, pointed
in the boy's direction.' The group ran to the boy and beat him "severely,"
rendering him unconscious and putting him into a coma lasting several
days.83
Mitchell was found guilty of aggravated battery, an offense normally
carrying a maximum sentence of two years." However, the jury found that
Mitchell selected his victim because of the victim's race." So, under a Wis-
consin law which enhanced penalties for any offense in which the defendant
"intentionally selects the [victim] ... because of the race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person" the
maximum possible sentence was increased to seven years.86 Mitchell was
eventually sentenced to four years in prison.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned the conviction, declaring the
penalty enhancement to be equivalent to the punishment of thought, and
therefore a violation of the First Amendment.88 The state court makes a dis-
tinction between an act of discrimination and the phenomenon of bigotry:
Discrimination and bigotry are not the same thing. Under antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, it is the discriminatory act which is prohibited. Under the
hate crimes statute [in this case], the "selection" which is punished is not
an act, it is a mental process. In this case, the act was the battery of [the
victim]; what was punished by the... statute was Mitchell's reason for se-
lecting [him], his discriminatory motive.89
The Wisconsin court contends that the law in question is aimed at
prejudice, at thought: "The statute is directed solely at the subjective motiva-
tion of the actor-his or her prejudice. Punishment of one's thought, how-
ever repugnant the thought, is unconstitutional."
The United States Supreme Court's unanimous decision reversed the
Wisconsin court.9 In his opinion Chief Justice Rehnquist claims that the
Wisconsin legislature in its penalty enhancement statute is punishing not
thought but conduct-that is, the intentional selection of a victim because of
80. Id.
81. Id. at 480.
82. Id.
83. Il
84. Id.
85. Id
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 481-82.
89. Wisconsin v. Todd Mitchell, 485 N.W. 807, 816-17 (1992).
90. Id. at 814.
91. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 483.
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his race.' Rehnquist points out that motive often comes into play in sentenc-
ing, as it does in laws enhancing penalties for murder for monetary gain.93
Sounding the familiar theme of judicial deference, Rehnquist writes that
"[t]he primary responsibility for fixing criminal penalties lies with the legis-
lature," and Wisconsin legislators have merely taken notice of the fact that
bias-motivated crimes bring worse consequences than similar non bias-
motivated crimes because they "are more likely to provoke retaliatory
crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite commu-
nity unrest."' "The State's desire to redress these perceived harms," writes
Rehnquist, "provides an adequate explanation for its penalty-enhancement
provision over and above mere disagreement with an offender's beliefs or
biases."'
Is Wisconsin punishing conduct or thought? And does it make a differ-
ence from the point of view of the First Amendment? When a state punishes
murder for money more harshly than murder for another motive, what sort of
judgment is it making? Clearly it is a moral judgment. Is this a judgment
permitted to it under the Constitution? Since there is no right to murder for
any reason, or in any context, the answer would seem to be yes.
But when Wisconsin adds years to Mitchell's sentence, what sort of
judgment is it making? A moral judgment that racial bias is unacceptable. Is
there a constitutional right to harbor racial animus? There is indeed, which
means the two cases are not entirely similar. If he and his friends had beaten
up this particular victim because he was fat, or effeminate, or well dressed,
Wisconsin would not be able to enhance the penalty. Calling the selection of
a victim "conduct," as Rehnquist does, is really a semantic game; Mitchell is
being punished more severely because the state does not like his ideas. Mur-
der for money is not an "idea" in the same sense. If Mitchell was a Commu-
nist and selected his victim because he was a Republican, it is hard to imag-
ine the Supreme Court handing down the same opinion.96 Even Chief Justice
Rehnquist, we might surmise, would take umbrage at penalty enhancement
for a Communist. But because the idea being punished here is racism, the
Court is willing to let the Wisconsin legislature have its way. It is seductive
in the extreme to allow the Wisconsin legislature to do this as a measure of
its official distaste for racism. This is a seduction the Supreme Court of the
United States should resist.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 485.
94. Id. at 486.
95. Id. at 488.
96. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
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V. THE FUNCTIONALIST THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS A THREAT
TO FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION
A. The Shortcomings of a Functionalist Theory of the First Amendment Can
be Seen in Libel Law
1. The Nature and Origin of the Functionalist Approach to the First
Amendment
One factor encouraging the trend to punish thought is that a mantra of
"political speech and public discourse" has been the over-arching theory
governing twentieth century jurisprudence regarding free speech. The ortho-
dox view has been that the First Amendment is designed above all to protect
discussions of government and traditional politics-public debate, public
discourse on topics of the day.97 Stretching back to the opinions of Holmes
and Brandeis at the beginning of the century, mainstream discussion of the
First Amendment has focused on speech regarding major political topics:
war and peace,9" the draft," capitalism and communism,'0 the attempt to or-
ganize new political parties and advocate new and unpopular political
ideas.' The major doctrines implementing the First Amendment, the clear
and present danger test"° and the test of "incitement" to immanent lawless-
ness in Brandenberg,°3 have come in cases involving unpopular political
ideas: communism," pacifism,"° socialism,'" white supremacy."t '
An alternative justification of the First Amendment would define a free
press as a necessary concomitant of free speech, and free speech as an aspect
of the Constitution's overall commitment to liberty. Indeed, there was a time
in the Court's history when such a justification for the First Amendment was
97. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 26-27 (1948) ("The principle of the freedom of speech springs from the neces-
sities of the program of self-government. It is not a Law of Nature or of Reason in the ab-
stract. It.is a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues -shall be decided
by universal suffrage.").
98. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204 (1919).
99. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S.
211 (1919); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
100. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290
(1961).
101. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
102. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47.
103. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
104. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 494.
105. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 47.
106. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 357.
107. See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
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common, and the abandonment of a "liberty" justification for the First
Amendment during the twentieth century is an interesting story ably related
by Mark Graber.'"'
As Graber describes, during much of the nineteenth century the Su-
preme Court and most influential legal commentators defined both free
speech and private property as equally important aspects of the Constitu-
tion's liberty." Scholars such as John Burgess, a political scientist, argued
that the rights of both free speech and private property flowed from the gen-
eral governmental obligation to carve out realms of individual autonomy-
an argument based on the idea of limiting government power, and thus an
argument with a straight-forward Lockean pedigree."'
Liberals in the Progressive era, however, horrified at the economic and
human consequences of the nineteenth century's "liberty," began to redefine
the terms of the constitutional debate; government needed to advance social
interests, they argued, rather than individual rights."' As such, they sought to
diminish the importance of a "right" to private property and, at the same
time, began developing a new theory of free speech."' In this theory, free
speech existed to serve the interests of listeners-an audience-rather than
the rights of an individual speaker."' The First Amendment existed to protect
debate on matters of public importance, so that the "right" solution could be
found to public problems: not to protect an individual who might have some-
thing he wished to say.""
Free speech was thus, for the Progressive era-the era of Brandeis"5 and
Holmes-about public debate, not private thoughts; the democratic process,
not individual expression. From this point forward, the purpose of the First
Amendment is conceptualized as functional; it existed to protect the role of
open discussions on matters of public importance."6 Liberty is irrelevant; the
concept of liberty is henceforth fatally tainted by its association with eco-
nomic liberty and the human toll of early industrial capitalism.""
The crucial figure in this transformation, Graber finds, is Zechariah
Chafee; his scholarly work in the teens and twenties is developed by the next
108. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF
CIvIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991).
109. Id. at 18-19.
110. Id. at 19. For a discussion of the importance of Lockean notions of limited govern-
ment to the constitutional framers, see HmscH supra note 76, at 36-38.
111. Id.at51.
112. Idat5l,87.
113. Id.at5,92-93.
114. Il at 9,92-93.
115. Brandeis himself argued that free speech was both a fundamental liberty and a ne-
cessity to the democratic process. See generally PMnP'P A. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDE1S:
JusuCE FOR Trm PEOPLE (1984). See specifically id at 314-35. I am grateful to Professor
Strum for reminding me of this fact.
116. Graber, supra note 108, at 2.
117. See id. at 12.
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generation of legal scholars, including, most prominently, Alexander Meik-
lejohn.'" As Graber convincingly argues, Chafee "concocted" a new theory
of free speech, and deliberately distorted and ignored the long-standing rela-
tionship in constitutional theory among speech, property, and liberty, a rela-
tionship based on the fundamental idea of limiting governmental power."'
This abandonment of a liberty-oriented theory moves the twentieth cen-
tury jurisprudence of free speech far from its constitutional roots. For the
constitutional framers, liberty could not exist where governmental power
could be used arbitrarily.' Censorship was a form of governmental arbi-
trariness with which they were quite familiar, and with which they became
openly concerned soon after the adoption of the Constitution.' The New
Deal established the idea that government's regulation of the economy-and
thus of private property-is not arbitrary, but is instead a part of the gov-
ernment's legitimate "police" and commerce powers." However, we can ac-
cept this sea-change in the idea of private property rights without, at the
same time, abandoning a liberty-oriented analysis of free speech in favor of a
functionalist theory."
But the new, functionalist defense of free speech, concocted by Chafee
and Meiklejohn, fit perfectly the larger philosophical trends of twentieth
century thought-the emphasis on relativism and the absence of absolute
truth.lu If truth is elusive or non-existent, and if answers to important public
questions are always debatable, then protecting the openness of that debate
on matters of public importance is paramount.
2. The Problems of Libel Law Show the Shortcomings of the Functionalist
Approach
This way of interpreting the First Amendment reached its zenith in the
Supreme Court's landmark case of New York Times v. Sullivan." However
the Court's ruling in Sullivan ran into trouble almost immediately in Time
Inc. v. Hill.'" That trouble illustrates some of the shortcomings of a purely
political interpretation of the First Amendment-if by "politics" we continue
to mean what Meiklejohn and Madison meant: the conventional politics of
voting and public policy-because Hill raised a very different set of issues,
issues hard to square with the Sullivan framework.
118. See id. at 1-15, 165, 169.
119. Id. at 2, 12.
120. See Hirsch supra note 76, at 51.
121. See id at 97-100 (discussing the importance of the Alien and Sedition Acts to the
First Amendment).
122. See hi at 87.
123. See id at 97.
124. EDWARD A. PURcELL, Tr CRISIS OF DEMocRAIc THEORY: SCMINTIFc NAT-
uRAuSM& THEPROBLEM OF VALUE 72-73 (1973).
125. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
126. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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B. New York Times v. Sullivan
Decided in 1964, at the height of the civil rights movement, the case in-
volved an action for libel by a city commissioner who directed the police
force in Montgomery, Alabama; he sued the Times for an ad accusing the
police of misconduct.'" There was no question that the ad, signed by promi-
nent figures in the civil rights movement, contained factual errors. An Ala-
bama jury awarded Sullivan $500,000 in punitive damages, a judgment af-
firmed by the Alabama Supreme Court.29
The Supreme Court reversed.'" Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
is considered a milestone in First Amendment jurisprudence, and with good
reason.' For Brennan, the issues in the case should be considered in light of
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public is-
sues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open, and that it may well in-
clude vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on gov-
ernment and public officials.' ' 2 The case thus turns on Sullivan's status as a
public official; although he may have been defamed by the false statements
appearing in the ad, the Court would not allow the libel judgment against the
Times to stand unless Sullivan could prove that the newspaper acted with
"actual malice"--that is, "with knowledge that [the ad] was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."'3 The Court found that
standard was not met and thus the libel judgment could not stand.'
The Court in Sullivan thus introduces a revolutionary idea and in the
process it elaborates what one commentator calls the first full statement by
the Supreme Court of an American theory of free speech: the First Amend-
ment prohibits public officials from collecting damages for libel except un-
der the most exceptional circumstances which are unlikely ever to obtain.35
At the heart of the Court's ruling is Brennan's notion that "the First
Amendment expresses the highest public concern that people freely discuss
public matters and the official conduct of public officers."'36 Explicitly in-
voking James Madison, Brennan relies upon the American idea of popular
127. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 256.
128. d. at 258.
129. Id. at 256.
130. Id. at 254.
131. See Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191; Melville Nimmer, The Right to Speak From
Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
CALiF. L. REV. 935 (1968).
132 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 270.
133. Id. at 279-80.
134. Id. at 280.
135. ANTHONY LEwIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLiVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
153 (1991).
136. William J. Brennan, Draft Opinion for New York Times v. Sullivan, page 17 re-
printed in LEwis supra note 135, at app. 1.
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sovereignty; Madison's "premise was that the Constitution created a form of
government under which 'the people, not the government, possess the abso-
lute sovereignty."" 37 This type of government "was 'altogether different'
from the British form under which the Crown was sovereign and the people
were subjects.' ' 9 In America, "the right of free public discussion of the
stewardship of public officials was thus, in Madison's view, a fundamental
principle of the American form of government."'
39
James Madison is thus Brennan's acknowledged source for his ruling in
Sullivan; his unacknowledged source is Alexander Meiklejohn. In Free
Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government, published in 1948, and in Po-
litical Freedom, published in 1960, the scholarly Meiklejohn endorsed and
elaborated the political interpretation of the First Amendment."4 "The pri-
mary purpose of the First Amendment," Meiklejohn wrote, "is.. .that all
citizens shall, so far as possible, understand the issues which bear upon our
common life."'' "The 'final aim' of [the] First Amendment... [is] 'the vot-
ing of wise decisions." " ' Traces of Meiklejohn are everywhere in Brennan's
opinion, as he himself came close to acknowledging in the annual "Meik-
lejohn lecture" he delivered at Brown University in 1965, the year after Sul-
livan was handed down.43 Many scholars have noted Meiklejohn's impor-
tance to Brennan's opinion.'"
C. Time, Inc. v. Hill"
The case involved the most reluctant of public figures: ordinary people
who become hostages, against their will, in a sensational crime. In 1952,
three escaped convicts took over a home in a suburb of Philadelphia, holding
137. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 274 (citing James Madison, Report in support of Vir-
ginia Resolutions of 1789, 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569-70
(1876)).
138. Id.
139. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 275. Legal historians have characterized this "politi-
cal" interpretation of the First Amendment as consistent with the intent of the framers. See,
e.g., WILLIAM WimCE, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 9-10
(1988) (emphasizing the importance to the First Amendment of the idea that citizens had the
right to petition government for the redress of their grievances); James Madison, The Daily
Advertiser, 17 August 1789, in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD
FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 152 (Helen E. Veit, et. al. eds., 1991) (In the debates
over the ratification of the Bill of Rights, Madison uses the phrase "the freedom of speech and
petitioning," illustrating the closeness of the two ideas in his mind.).
140. ALEXANDER MEKLmOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 26-28, 75 (1960) [hereinafter POLITICAL FREEDOM].
141. Id. at 75, quoted in ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 270 (1995) [hereinafter CONSTITTIONAL DOMAINS].
142. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 140, at 26, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 141, at 270.
143. LEWIS, supra note 135, at 155.
144. See &L at 154. See also GRABER, supra note 108, at 168-69, 182.
145. 385 U.S 374 (1967).
[Vol. 37
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 37 [2000], No. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol37/iss2/2
2001] MAJORITARIAN POLITICS & THE PUNISHMENT OF SPEECH 235
James Hill and his family hostage.'" As a result of the unwanted and sensa-
tional publicity surrounding the case, the Hills moved to Connecticut.47 In
1955, Life magazine reported, falsely, that a new play, The Desperate Hours,
was based on the Hills' experience."" In the play, the convicts act quite bru-
tally, beating the father and molesting a daughter; the article in Life made it
sound-falsely-as if such things happened to the Hills. 49
The Hills' case was argued before the Supreme Court in 1966.15' As An-
thony Lewis relates, a majority of the Court initially voted to reject Time's
First Amendment claim of immunity. 5' However, Chief Justice Warren as-
signed the opinion to Justice Fortas, who wrote a strong opinion condemning
the magazine's actions.'" The language in his opinion awakened Justice
Black, a First Amendment absolutist, who denounced the opinion; the case
was put over for reargument 53
Eventually, in a five-to-four decision, the Court held in favor of the
magazine.' Justice Brennan, now writing for the majority, analyzed the case
within the framework of Sullivan.'55 The state of New York could not allow
the awarding of damages for "false reports of matters of public interest" ab-
sent a showing of actual malice.'56
It is a long way from the public official in Sullivan to the "matters of
public interest" in the case of the Hills. Sullivan had voluntarily accepted a
government position; the Hills were thrust into the glare of sensational pub-
licity against their will. If the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect
and facilitate traditional political activity-such as knowledge of and discus-
sion by citizens about government action-it is hard to understand how the
same logic applies to the Hills. Justice Brennan attempts to make the
connection by saying: "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a
concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an
essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on free-
dom of speech and of the press."'" All of that is true-but it would be the
basis of a very different kind of justification of First Amendment freedoms
than the Madison/Meiklejohn approach embraced in Sullivan.
146. Id. at 378.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 377-79.
149. Id See also Lewis, supra note 135, at 184.
150. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 374.
151. Lewis, supra note 135, at 185.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 380.
155. See id. at 387-92 where Brennan, often citing Sullivan, sets up the framework to
analyze the facts.
156. Id. at 387-88.
157. Id. at 388
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Shortly after handing down its decision in Hill, the Court expanded the
Sullivan ruling once again. In Curtis v. Butts,' a badly fractured Court ruled
that the "actual malice" standard applied to public figures as well as public
officials. The case involved Wally Butts, the athletic director at the Univer-
sity of Georgia, and an accusation that he had fixed football games.'59 The
crucial opinion was Chief Justice Warren's;'" he explained his decision to
expand the Sullivan framework this way:
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and
private sectors are blurred. Since the depression of the 1930's and World
War II there has been a rapid fusion of economic and political power, a
merging of science, industry and government, and a high degree of inter-
action between the intellectual, governmental and business worlds....
Inmany situations, policy determinations which traditionally were chan-
neled through formal political institutions are now originated and imple-
mented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions,
corporations and associations, some only loosely connected with the Gov-
ernment .... 16
Again-all of that may be true, and might have been relevant if the case
was an action for libel by the CEO of General Motors, or a member of a
government advisory board-but a football coach? What on earth does accu-
sations of fixed football games have to do with the military-industrial com-
plex, or "policy determinations"? Where is the connection between govern-
ment and Hollywood celebrities? Carol Burnett's drinking habits? Liz
Taylor's husbands? Tom Cruise's sexual preferences?
D. The Functionalist Approach no Longer Functions
This functionalist theory of the First Amendment, and its major expres-
sion-the "political" understanding of speech-is what we now live with.
But, as we have seen in the cases examined above, this theory has definite
limitations. What about the individual speaker, whose desire to speak may
not coincide with the interests, or politics, of the majority? What of her lib-
erty? A political, functionalist defense of the First Amendment is always go-
ing to run the risk of being majoritarian-whatever the majority defines as
major issues of the day, or the range of acceptable ideas, will be protected.
What of minorities? Who gets to define what "politics" consist of?.
Protecting the liberty of minorities has been an essential component,
perhaps the essential component, of American constitutionalism from the
beginning. And, as Graber describes, the close association between free
speech and liberty, so clear to nineteenth century jurists and scholars, was
158. Curtis v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
159. Id. at 135.
160. Lewis supra note 135, at 190.
161. lL
162. See Hirsch, supra note 76, at 5.
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deliberately obscured by twentieth--t.-entury scholars with a specific political
agenda." That agenda eventually l(d to a "liberal" interpretation of the First
Amendment, but it was liberal onl: in protecting unpopular political ideas-
again, within a narrow, conventiorial understanding of politics."'
But it is pornographers, sexi.sts, and racists that need the protection of
the First Amendment today, not socialists and pacifists. And, despite many
attempts at doing so, neither the Supreme Court nor commentators have been
able to persuasively demonstrate why (for example) racists should have
fewer rights than socialists. 7The distinction between racists and socialists
works only if one accepts a fianctionalist, majoritarian, "political" theory of
the First Amendment-the t1',eory of Meildejohn, as enshrined in New York
Times v. Sullivan.
Meiklejohn's approach to the First Amendment no longer works. It does
not work because: (1) the Supreme Court ran into almost immediate trouble
applying the Sullivan framework to new cases; (2) many of our most impor-
tant free speech cases hava nothing whatever to do with traditional politics;
and (3) there is a theoretical flaw in Mieklejohn's theory.
Meiklejohn states that "what is essential is not that everyone shall
speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said."' But, as Robert Post
perceptively points out, this statement requires a standard, a standard "by
which the quality of tbIe community's thinking process can be assessed."'"
Meiklejohn's own standard was straight forward: It was based on the model
of the traditional town meeting. Meiklejohn says that "the traditional Ameri-
can town meeting" is the appropriate First Amendment model. 67 "That insti-
tution," he says, "is commonly, and rightly, regarded as a model by which
free political proced'ares may be measured."'68 Such a meeting "is not a Hyde
Park"; it is not a pliace of "unregulated talkativeness."" A town meeting is
rather "a group of free and equal men [sic], cooperating in a common enter-
prise, and using for that enterprise responsible and regulated discussion."'70
Their object is "to act upon matters of public interest" and thus their speech
is regulated: speakers must be recognized by the chair and must confine their
remarks to "the. question before the house."'' No one may interrupt someone
163. Graber, supra note 108, at 124-25.
164. Id. at 172.
165. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 140, at 26, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 141, at 270.
166. CONSTrruTIONAL DOMAINS, supra note 141, at 270.
167. PoLrIcAL FREEDOM, supra note 140, at 24, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 141, at 270.
168. Id.
169. POLMCAL FREEDOM, supra note 140, at 25-26, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL
DOMAINs, supra note 141, at 270.
170. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 140, at 25, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 141, at 270.
171. POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 140, at 24, quoted in CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS,
supra note 141, at 271.
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who has the floor."' "The meeting has assembled, not primarily to talk, but
primarily by means of talking to get business done." Thus "the talking must
be regulated and abridged... ."" People xwho break the rules may be denied
the floor. 4
Thus, as Post says, a town meeting is an instrumental organization, de-
signed to achieve "important and specific ends."' Participants in a town
meeting share a common enterprise.176 There: is, in other words, already an
agreement-an antecedent agreement-on wlaat needs to be accomplished in
a town meeting.1"
This model of the town meeting, as Post rightly argues, "violates [the]
necessary indeterminacy of public discourse," avnd "authorizes censorship on
the basis of assumptions about fairness and prooedure."'78 Meiklejohn's the-
ory is "ultimately grounded in a distinctive and controversial conception of
collective identity.'79 His paradigm of the town nieeting specifically presup-
poses that the function of American democracy is to achieve an orderly, effi-
cient, and rational dispatch of common business."' 0 This is "an insufficiently
radical" conception of "the reach of self-determinarion."' 8'
One does not have to be a post-modernist to recognize that the America
in which we live is not a town meeting writ large, that rationality is a loaded
concept and debatable ideal, that there are convulsiwve disagreements within
our society about appropriate goals and policies, including, most promi-
nently, debates about who gets to participate in public discussions in the first
place, and on what terms. It is precisely to protect someone saying to Amer-
ica's majority "you can no longer declare us out of order" that the First
Amendment is most needed. A theory of free speech that depends on treating
America as if it were a town meeting writ large-the theory enshrined by the
modem Supreme Court-is inevitably going to lead to the censorship of in-
dividual thought, a censorship based on the notions of today's political ma-
jority.
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